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Recent Decisions
LABOR LAW - THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
IN ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS
Textile Workers Union of America v. American Thread Co.,
291 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1961)
This case' originated when the American Thread Company discharged
an employee for carelessness in the performance of his job. The union
protested his discharge, using the medium of the grievance procedure
set forth in the collective bargaining agreement. The company agreed
to arbitrate, and the matter was submitted to a hearing. At the hearing
the arbitrator found that there was just cause for discipline, but that dis-
charge was too severe a punishment, and ordered reinstatement after a
week's suspension. When the company refused to comply with this
decision, the union filed suit in the United States District Court. The
district court granted the company's motion for summary judgment on
the grounds that the arbitrator had exceeded the scope of his authority.2
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the trial court's decision was upheld,
and enforcement of the arbitrator's order was refused.3
The important issues dealt with by the court in this case were whether
the arbitrator over-extended his authority under the terms of the col-
lective bargaining agreement and the submission to arbitration, and
whether this overreaching was of such a nature that the court should
interfere and set aside his award.
4
1. Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 291 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1961).
2. Prior to this decision, the district court had refused the case for lack of jurisdiction. Upon
appeal by the union, the court of appeals remanded. Textile Workers Union v. American
Thread Co., 271 F.2d 277 (4th Cit. 1959). In remanding, the court of appeals cited Enter-
prise Wheel & Car Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 269 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1959), and Textile
Workers Union v. Cone Mills Corp., 268 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1959). These decisions upheld
the jurisdiction of federal courts over arbitration cases.
3. Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 291 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1961). In so
holding, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit aligned itself with those few district
courts and courts of appeals which have acted contrary to what the Supreme Court has indi-
cated should be the policy of federal courts, that is, that courts should not ordinarily review labor
arbitration cases. The position of these minority courts reflects an attempt to retain the tradi-
tional judicial function of final review of administrative decisions under all circumstances.
4. Another issue discussed by the court was whether there had been jurisdiction over the
subject matter. It correctly ruled that jurisdiction was proper. The court of appeals pointed
out that there is no jurisdiction only in actions where it is sought to enforce some right outside
the terms of the bargaining agreement. See Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955). Where the matter to be arbitrated
comes within the terms of the agreement and the submission to arbitration, then the district
court has jurisdiction. In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 488 (1957), the
Supreme Court established that there were no constitutional barriers to enforcement of col-
lective barganing agreements by the courts and that Congress had intended them to be en-
forced. A federal district court could compel arbitration when the contract so provided, and
one of the parties was recalcitrant.
The jurisdiction of the courts was further defined in Textile Workers Union v. Cone
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The court answered both of these questions in the affirmative, saying
that the arbitrator was limited to a determination of "just cause" for
discipline by the terms of the contract and the submission to arbitration.
He could not act beyond that finding to pass on the degree of punish-
ment imposed by the company. This holding was based upon the court's
interpretation of the controlling agreements.
Pertinent articles of the collective bargaining agreement are in con-
flict with each other in this case. The "Management Rights" provision
provides that any action of the company should be subject to the griev-
ance procedure, up to but not including arbitration, unless expressly pro-
vided for. It then specifies that any change in work rules should ex-
pressly be subject to arbitration.5
The court reasoned that the latter provision for arbitration is an
example of the express exception provided for in the preceding part of
Mills Corp., 268 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1959), wherein it was held that the district court has
the authority to enforce the award of the arbitrator. The Supreme Court denied certiorari,
in effect indicating their tacit approval of the decision, 361 U.S. 886 (1959).
5. Article III of the collective bargaining agreement is the "Management Rights" provision,
which states:
"It is agreed that, except as expressly limited or modified in this Agreement, the Com-
pany has the right of management. This includes, among other things, the right... to dis-
cipline or discharge employees for just cause .... [A]l rights heretobefore exercised by or
inherent in the Management, and not expressly contracted away by the terms of this Agreement
are retained by the Management. Any action by the Company under this section may be
made the subject of... grievance procedure, up to but not including arbitration, unless as
otherwise hereinafter expressly provided in this Agreement. It is expressly agreed, however,
that should the Company change existing work rules, that such changes are subject to the
grievance and arbitration procedure under this Agreement." (Emphasis added by the court.)
Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 291 F.2d 894, 903 (4th Cir. 1961).
6. The next article of importance is IV. Sections 1, 2, and 3 provide:
1. "Just Cause - Employees shall be disciplined or discharged only for just cause, which
shall include ... failure of an employee to properly perform his job in accordance with the
Company standards ....
2. "Procedure - In all cases of discharge or discipline, the Company will promptly
present a written statement to the employee... involved giving the cause of the discharge or
discipline. The employee or the Union shall have the right to make such a matter a grievance,
subject to the grievance procedure of this Agreement ....
3. "Finding - Should it be determined that any employee was disciplined or discharged
without just cause, such employee shall be restored.., provided, however, that no arbitrator
may award back pay for a period exceeding ninety (90) days .... Id. at 898.
Article VII provides:
"Disputes, grievances, or disagreements involving application or interpretation of this
agreement ... not satisfactorily adjusted under the Grievance Procedure set out in the preced-
ing section shall be promptly referred to arbitration.... The findings and decisions of the
arbiter shall be final and binding to both parties hereto. The aribter shall make no award
affecting a change, modification or addition to this Agreement and shall confine himself to
the facts submitted in the hearing, the evidence before him and the terms of the contract....
Id. at 898.
In addition to the terms of the contract the stipulation in the submission to arbitration
was also considered by the court.
"Under the terms of the contract and within the limits of those terms, including the re.
strictions on the power of the arbitrator... has the union proved, a violation of the contract?
If so, and within the same limitations, what should be the remedy?" (Emphasis added by
the court.) Id. at 897.
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Article III, and that the parties intended any other exception to the "no
arbitration" requirement to have been set forth in a similar manner as an
express exception. In so holding, the court overlooked the apparent
contradiction established by the subsequent articles of the agreement'
These articles outline the grievance procedures and provide that any
dispute involving the agreement, and not otherwise settled, should be
submitted to arbitration.!
The court further pointed out that the company could discipline or
discharge for "just cause," and that an example of "just cause" was failure
to perform according to company standards.' Thus, once the arbitrator
decided that there was failure to perform properly, "just cause" was
established, and the company could punish according to its discretion.
The arbitrator could not decide the punishment, and when he did so, he
exceeded his authority under the contract and the submission. Therefore,
the court refused to enforce the award.
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Sobeloff took exception to the
reasoning of the majority.' Article IV, section 3 of the collective bargain-
ing agreement expressly mentions an arbitrator's award in a discharge or
discipline case. He said this section would have no purpose were arbitra-
tion not intended. Thus, arbitration of a discharge or discipline griev-
ance is expressly provided for in Article IV. Article VII expressly pro-
vides for arbitration of any dispute involving the application or interpre-
tation of the agreement when no other settlement can be reached.'"
The dissent pointed out the error of the majority in confining the
arbitrator's authority to deciding only the issue of "just cause." It was a
question of interpretation of the contract as to the scope of the arbitrator's
authority. The arbitrator was the exclusive interpreter, and unless he
assumed authority dearly beyond the scope of a reasonable interpretation
of the agreement, his determination should not have been disturbed.
His finding was certainly reasonable that the determination of "just
cause" included the determination of the degree of punishment that ac-
companied it. The dissent concluded that the arbitrator did not exceed
his authority under the contract or the submission.'
The majority decision is in conflict with a recent trilogy of Supreme
Court cases which are the landmarks for the treatment of labor arbitration
7. See Article VII of the collective bargaining agreement, supra note 6.
8. Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 291 F.2d 894, 900 (4th Cir. 1961).
9. Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 291 F.2d 894, 902 (4th Cir. 1961)
(dissenting opinion).
10. The conflict between the sections of the agreement is probably the result of poor draft-
ing. The fact remains, however, that the question of arbitrability should never have been
raised, since by submitting to arbitration, the company waived any objection thereto.
11. Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 291 F.2d 894, 904 (4th Cir. 1961)
(dissenting opinion).
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by the federal courts." Several rules which limit judicial review may be
gained from these three cases. In United Steelworkers v. American
Manufacturing Company the Supreme Court stated the proposition that
the courts are confined to determining whether the party seeking arbitra-
tion is making a claim which on its face is governed by the contract.
Whether the moving party is right or wrong is a question of interpreta
tion of the contract, a question solely for the arbitrator." In United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Company, an action to com-
pel arbitration, the Supreme Court said:
In the absence of any express provision excluding a particular griev-
ance from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a
purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail, particularly
where, as here, the exclusion clause is vague and the arbitration clause
quite broad.' 4
It was pointed out in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corporation that the Court in the Warrior case intended to say that
federal courts should generally decline to review the merits of arbitration
awards and decline to review whether or not the matter was arbitrable
in the first instance.'" In the Enterprise case it was held that the arbitra-
tion or award should not be disturbed unless clearly beyond the scope of
the agreement, and it was implied that the award is presumed to have
been within the scope of the agreement. "
The dissenting opinion pointed out that the majority in the instant
case misinterpreted the Warrior decision. The majority attempted to
distinguish the present case from the Warrior case because of the clause
in Article III of the collective bargaining agreement, which excludes
grievances from arbitration unless arbitration is expressly provided
for.' The majority said that this clause is the express exclusion from
arbitration called for in Warrior and that there is no express exception
which allows arbitration. However, in Warrior, the Court was not talk-
ing about an exclusion clause working in this way, but rather one which
worked in an opposite fashion by providing for arbitration of grievances,
absent an express exception providing for no arbitration.'"
The majority are not alone in their interpretation of the Supreme
12. The three Supreme Court cases are: United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
13. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
14. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 584-85 (1960).
15. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
16. Id. at 598.
17. Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 291 F.2d 894, 897 (4th Cir. 1961).
18. In United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 576 (1960),
the exclusion clause provided that the enumerated management rights were not subject to
grievance proceedings at any level.
1962]
